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Abstract. This article explores the issue of observable instability in financial markets 
interpreted as a long-term process of adaptation to demand for money, which, in turn, is 
based on the expected depreciation of fixed assets. Exploration is based on verifying 
empirically the hypothesis that the velocity of money is significantly, negatively correlated 
with the pace of technological change. The purpose of exploration is to assess the well-
founded of policies, which use financial and monetary tools, rather than the 
straightforwardly fiscal ones, to stimulate technological change. Empirical research 
suggests that aggregate depreciation of fixed assets is a significant factor inducing slower a 
circulation of money.  
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1. Introduction 
he theory of money and finance systematically turns around the more or less 
explicit assumption that financial markets are inherently unstable. Seminal 
contributions in that direction of research start with Adam Smith, who 
claimed that lack of prudence in the issuance of currency can destabilize an 
economy. The now classical development by Kindleberger & Aliber (1978-2005) 
points at an interesting pattern of contradiction in economic history: although 
financial crises are always perceived, at the moment, as instances of deep 
disequilibrium, their recurrence suggests, strangely enough, that they are a 
symptom of some long-term equilibrium, which we do not exactly understand. 
Another seminal contribution, from Hayman Minsky (1992), suggests that we 
should always assume that financial markets are unstable and volatile: this is just 
safer for economic policy. That stream of literature seems to focus on short-term 
reactions of economic agents to financial stimuli, and tends to assume that the 
short-term reactions are the only relevant ones. Yet, another theoretical view can be 
coined from the available literature. The quite convincing developments of post-
Keynesianism, especially those coming from Franco Modigliani (see, for example: 
Modigliani & Brumberg 1954 - 2005; Ando & Modigliani 1963) suggest that in the 
long-term perspective of a life-cycle, where economic agents have the time and the 
motivation to correct their line of action, short-term financial decisions sum up to 
very rational an adaptation to the economic environment. Thus, a general 
theoretical question can be formulated: is the observable instability of financial 
markets just an instability, or is it, in fact, the symptom of a deeper, long term 
process of imperfect adaptation in the economic system as a whole? 
There is a practical policy question behind the elegant theoretical curtain. The 
relative success of quantitative ease policies, especially in the United States, 
induces the general question whether monetary policy shouldn’t break free of the 
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tight muzzle of interest rates, and become, instead, a creation of markets rather than 
simple creation of credit. Some experiences in that respect seem pessimistic. Both 
the explosion of derivatives in the 1990ies, and the frantic securitization of loans 
after 2000, seem to have brought more trouble than benefit. Still, there is that 
intuition that money, used in a clever way, can change things for the better, and 
quantitative ease proved it to be correct.  
Data published by the World Bank allows observing a systematically decreasing 
velocity of money in the global economy. The observation is based on the metric 
labelled ‘Supply of broad money as % of GDP’. The metric is a ratio of the actual 
supply of money, in absolute monetary amounts, divided by the Gross Domestic 
Product. Incidentally, this is exactly the reciprocal of the velocity of money, which 
is canonically defined as ‘V = Q/M’. Under the category labelled ‘World’, the 
statistic provided by the World Bank allows calculating an aggregate, global 
velocity of money at the level of V = 1,85 in 1962. In 1972, that global velocity 
falls to V = 1.511, to reach V = 0,849 in 2014, and V = 0,815 in 2015. Money is 
slowing down. A vaguely similar change is observable also at the level of 
distributive average, calculated as the average velocity of money in the population 
of countries surveyed by the World Bank. That average is equal to 4,442 in 1962, 
falls to 3,809 in 1972, then it goes through an intriguing peak between 1974 and 
1985, when it sometimes exceeds 8.0, just to pass into a descending trend 
afterwards and register V = 1,871 in 2014. As we can see, the distributive average 
in the velocity of money is generally higher and less uniform it its trend than the 
aggregate average to be found under the label ‘World’. This is partly linked to the 
distinction between the developed economies, on the one hand, and the emerging 
markets, as well as developing countries, on the other hand. The first category (e.g. 
Denmark, United States) display a fairly stable, long-term curve in the velocity of 
money, still with a slightly ascending tendency. The latter, conversely, experience 
a very profuse supply of money per unit of real output, and a quickly decreasing 
velocity of money.  
Against those stylized facts, we have the basic monetarist theory, which 
assumes essentially a constant velocity of money, with every significant variation 
in that respect being considered as a symptom of disequilibrium in financial 
markets. Facts suggest that what is commonly considered as disequilibrium, could 
be, in fact, a mechanism of adaptation, in the social system, to some kind of deeper 
social change. As social change is considered, a range of other facts is to mention. 
Since 2008, the world of finance has witnessed the turbulent development of the 
phenomenon called ‘cryptocurrencies’, or, in other terms, ‘block-chained 
currencies’. Bitcoin is probably the elder in the family, and the best known, but the 
world of cryptocurrencies comprises today over 800 different ones, although just 
some 620 have any significant market capitalization, (see, for example: 
www.coinmarketcap.com or www.bitinfocharts.com). In very crude terms, the 
probability that a new cryptocurrency emerges somewhere in the world is some 4 
times greater than the probability of seeing a new national currency. 
Cryptocurrencies display those peculiar characteristics, which, fault of a better 
term, can be called ‘proto-money’. These are legal deeds, whose status is 
somewhere between speculative assets and money strictly spoken, i.e. whose 
balances can have, for their primary function, either to create opportunities for 
quick profit, or to settle accounts. Besides, the technology at the base of 
cryptocurrencies, the so-called ‘Block-chain’, with its dispersion into many local 
blocks of transactions, periodically locked with one major deal that checks the 
price discount rate, is very similar in its logic to the system of issuance and 
circulation created, once in the past, for the commercial bills of exchange.  
Thus, as the global economy creates more and more money per unit of real 
output, experimentation with new types of money has intensified during the last 
decade. It looks as if the global economy needed more money. What does it need 
money for? The last edition of a database known as Penn Tables 9.0 (Feenstra et al. 
2015) brings two interesting insights in that respect. Firstly, aggregate depreciation 
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of fixed assets, when corrected for national purchasing power parities, makes a 
growing proportion of the national GDP, across the 182 national economies 
surveyed in the database. In 1980, aggregate depreciation made, on average, 9,5% 
of a national GDP. In 2000, that ratio climbed to 12.8%, to reach 18,6% in 2014. 
Interestingly, when the same depreciation is calculated without correction for 
purchasing power, just at current national prices of assets, converted into constant 
2011 US dollars, the trend looks different: it becomes bell-shaped, with its belly 
the most protruding upwards during the 1980ies, around 20%, and currently at 
18%. It looks as if, over the last six decades, a long-term, inflationary pressure on 
the prices of fixed assets had taken place. Anyway, when related to purchasing 
power, the national income of most countries has less and less capacity to 
compensate the obsolescence of their fixed assets. Secondly, the average share of 
government expenditures in the national capital stock, in the population of 
countries studied in Penn Tables 9.0, follows a curve strangely similar to that 
observable in the global velocity of money. This particular metric can be 
interpreted as the capacity of governments to redistribute capital through their 
expenditures, and since the 1980ies it is systematically decreasing.  
The global economy creates more and more money per unit of real output, 
whilst said output displays a decreasing capacity to compensate the depreciation of 
fixed assets, which allows guessing an increasing speed of obsolescence in these 
assets. Governments seem to have less and less economic power to redistribute 
capital. A new generation of currencies, strangely similar to the historically known 
systems of bills of exchange, is emerging under our eyes. All these phenomena 
taken together suggest some kind of monetary adaptation to an accelerating 
technological change. Data published by the World Bank, and primarily provided 
by WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organisation) allows observing a slowly, 
but steadily growing value in the ratio of resident patent applications per one 
million inhabitants, across the globe. Growth in this metric is far from being 
rocketing, and still, in 2014 there was, on average, 175.6 resident patent 
applications filed per million people, against 124.2 in 1990. World Development 
Report 2016, entitled ‘Digital Dividends’ and issued by the World Bank, 
interestingly suggests a systematic lag in gains from digital technologies behind the 
potential of those technologies (World Bank, 2016). 
Against the dominant background of the classical monetarism, there is a stream 
of thought, known since, at least, the 17th century and the principles of 
mercantilism, which claims that money can be an autonomous social force, and not 
just a medium of payment. Contemporarily to Adam Smith, Joseph de Pinto 
engaged in a long-lasting (and probably life-endangering) polemic with Marquis de 
Mirabeau, arguing that creation of money, also indirectly, via the development of 
markets for public debt, can be an autonomous force facilitating progress and 
social well-being (see: Mirabeau 1760; Pinto 1771). A much more modern 
contribution in that respect had been made by Paul Samuelson (1958), who 
suggested that money can be a social contrivance, serving to transfer value not just 
in space, but also in time. Against the dominant assumption that money loses value 
over time, Samuelson proposed a theoretical network for studying money as a 
technology serving to transmit accumulated value between generations. The 
theoretical framework proposed by Paul Samuelson rests on a central assumption 
that the supply of money can and should increase at a basic rate closely correlated 
with the rate of demographic growth. The present article experiments with 
transplanting the same type of reasoning, from generations of humans to 
generations of technologies, in order to explain the stylized facts mentioned 
previously.  
At any given moment, there are three generations of technologies in use: 
emergent, established, and declining. The pace of technological change can be seen 
as the proportion between the relative diversity (or simply the sheer number) of 
technologies available in each of those generations. The more are there emergent 
technologies, the greater is the pressure on the obsolescence of the established 
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ones, thus on their transition to the declining generation. If the diversity in 
emergent technologies, thus, for example, the propensity to patent new inventions, 
grows systematically, an increasing pressure towards obsolescence appears.  The 
greater is that obsolescence, and the faster is the pace of replacement, in the world 
of technologies, the greater amount of capital is needed to finance the process. At 
this point, it is useful to remember that the supply of money is, and historically has 
always been the supply of account money, not cash money (see for example: 
Braudel 1981; 1983). Both presently, and historically, the greatest amounts of 
money have been created to settle intangible capital accounts, not to pay for 
tangible things. From the practical point of view, money is needed mostly and 
primarily to assure liquidity in balance sheets, and only secondarily in the markets 
of goods and services. In other words, when technological change accelerates, it 
could lead, through increased depreciation and compensatory behaviour from the 
part of entrepreneurs, to the swelling of balance sheets, and to a correspondingly 
growing demand for money. That’s why, in the  following part of this article, the 
author explores the hypothesis, according to which there is a significant, negative 
correlation between the pace of technological change, as measured by the pace of 
depreciation in fixed assets, and the velocity of money. 
 
2. The theoretical model 
The purpose of the here-presented theoretical model is to explain, why 
technological progress, for example in terms of labour productivity or dividends on 
digital technologies, is generally slower than expected, whilst, in the same time, 
why such progress below expectations takes place in the context of systematically 
decreasing velocity of money, as well as a decreasing economic power of 
constitutional states, measured as the share of their expenditures in the available 
capital stock. Thus, the general theoretical drift developed below goes towards 
simulating investment decisions, which barely catch on technological progress.  
It is assumed that entrepreneurs build their individual balance sheets on the 
grounds of expected useful life in their assets. Expectations as for the useful life of 
assets are formed on the grounds of observed, actual depreciation ‘D’. Thus, 
entrepreneurs accumulate capital so as to provide for the expected 
depreciation‘D*’, which is estimated based on currently observed depreciation and 
its volatility. Depreciation is significantly, although not exclusively driven by the 
replacement of established technologies by the new, emergent ones. This implies 
that both an individual balance sheet of one business, and the aggregate balance 
sheet of a whole economy is a quasi-random outcome of investment decisions 
based mostly on the entrepreneurs’ willingness to ‘stay in the game’. Thus, the 
present model is a distant echo of the Keynesian classic, with just some 
assumptions released. Gross investment does not have to be equal to depreciation; 
it is just based on the observed depreciation. Entrepreneurs can take into account a 
variable number of factors, yet at the end of the day their main investment goal is 
to keep their assets valuable. Equity is the quasi-random, uncertain outcome of 
investment decisions combined with borrowing decisions. The propensity to 
leverage assets with creditis also quasi-randomly distributed across the population 
of entrepreneurs, who want to maintain an individually, arbitrary financial 
liquidity, with money, as a form of assets, expected to have quasi-infinite useful 
life, i.e. indefinite from the point of view of individual business decisions. 
As a result, an aggregate, current demand for credit, or ‘DC’ is generated by the 
whole population of entrepreneurs. Banks respond to shifts in DC in an imperfectly 
efficient way: the total supply of money contains either a lag, or an overhang, 
regarding the current demand for credit.    
Current, aggregate depreciation in individual balance sheets is the outcome of 
two factors: useful life of assets, and their current book value. The latter, in turn, is 
the outcome of past anticipation regarding their depreciation. In other words, 
aggregate depreciation results from two combined processes. The first is a trend 
regarding the speed of replacement in technologies, essentially imposed by the 
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pace of science. The second is the quasi-random outcome of past investment 
decisions. 
Two, superimposing, geometric Brownian motions in, respectively, aggregate 
depreciation ‘D’ and aggregate supply of money ‘M’: 
 
dMt = µ1Mtdt + o1MtW(D) 
dDt = µ2Dtdt + o2AtW(D) 
 
Where D is depreciation, M stands for the supply of money, W(D) is a Wiener 
process in depreciation, and A symbolizes the book value of assets.  
Those two geometric Brownian motions can be summarized in the hypothesis: 
there is a significant, negative correlation between the pace of technological 
change, as measured by the pace of depreciation in fixed assets, and the velocity of 
money. 
 
3. The empirical check 
The purpose of the here-presented empirical check is to set an empirical basis 
for the theoretical model presented in the previous chapter of this article. This 
encompasses two separate steps. In the first one, at as high a level of aggregation as 
possible, partial proof should is being produced regarding the occurrence of 
geometric Brownian motion in, respectively, aggregate depreciation of fixed assets, 
and aggregate supply of money. In a second step, linear modelling of the link 
between technological change and velocity of money is undertaken. The relative 
impact of technological change on the velocity of money is estimated, together 
with contextual, explanatory variables.   
 
3.1. The dataset 
The dataset used for empirical research in this article is essentially Penn Tables 
9.0 (see: Feenstra et al. 2015), which the author allowed himself to compile with 
selected data published by the World Bank, mostly regarding the supply of money, 
as well as the density of population etc. Unless it is specified otherwise, all 
econometric tests have been conducted on natural logarithms of empirical values 
from the dataset. For the purposes of the present research, and more specifically for 
proving, at least partially, the existence of geometric Brownian motion aggregate 
depreciation and aggregate supply of money, the author has aggregated those 
variables in the database, on an annual basis. The results of aggregation, and thus 
the source values for the partial proof of geometric Brownian motion are available, 
to the best author’s knowledge, at his Google Drive, at the following link: 
[Retrieved from]. 
 
3.2. Partial proof of geometric Brownian motion 
The existence of geometric Brownian motion can be partially proven by 
checking the two following conditions: ln[x(1)]has mean ln[x(0)]+ µt and 
varianceo2t. Checking the means, for respectively, aggregate depreciation and 
aggregate supply of money, has been done in reverse order. For each annual 
aggregate, the value [ln(xt) – ln(x0)]/t has been calculated, as an approximation of 
the total: drift coefficient µplus volatility component o2t. Please, note that the time 
series of aggregate depreciation in Penn Tables 9.0 start in 1950, whilst data on the 
supply of money, as published by the World Bank, starts in 1960. Those two years 
are the respective ‘x0’ values for both variables. In a next step, the value [ln(xt) – 
ln(x0)]/t2 has been calculated, as an estimation of the volatility component o2t, and 
then subtracted from [ln(xt) – ln(x0)]/t, in order to narrow down the analysis to the 
aggregate drift. 
As a result, regarding aggregate depreciation, a progressively decreasing 
volatility component has been identified, ranging from 0,0294 in 1950 to 0,0008 in 
2014. The cumulative drift observable in aggregate depreciation starts at 0,0294 in 
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1951, and reaches 0,0566 in 2014. As for the supply of money, volatility 
progressively decreases from 0,0144 in 1962, to 0,0011 in 2014, with the 
cumulative drift starting at 0,0274 in 1961, and reaching 3,1912.  
This is a partial, and therefore indirect proof regarding the existence of 
geometric Brownian motion in the two aggregate variables of the theoretical 
model. Still, some conclusions can be drawn. Whilst geometric Brownian motion 
seems to be there in both cases, it also seems to have different characteristics. 
Changes in aggregate depreciation display relatively slow a drift and very little 
volatility, whilst the aggregate supply of money is more volatile, and presents a 
much stronger drift over time.    
 
3.3. Linear modelling - the general case 
The general case has been constructed as an attempt to grasp the functional link 
between the velocity of money and technological change. The velocity of money is 
calculated as the reciprocal of the variable supplied by the World Bank, namely of 
the supply of broad money measured as a percentage share of the Gross Domestic 
Product. As the corresponding variable of the World Bank is simply ‘M/Q’, its 
reciprocal, namely ‘Q/M’ is the exact equivalent of velocity of money. 
Technological change is represented with just one variable, namely aggregate 
depreciation per million inhabitants, or, in other words, the intensity of 
obsolescence in established technologies, measured on a double base made of the 
capital stock and population.Aggregate depreciation was measured on the capital 
base corrected for changes in the national purchasing power parities, or, in other 
words, as a fraction of the value recorded in Penn Tables 9.0 as ‘ck’. On the 
grounds of considerations presented in the preceding subchapter, this capital 
measure seems less prone to observation bias.  This variable is being placed in a 
broad context, which is being sketched starting with the assumption that the 
velocity of money has a residual component, constant regarding all the variables 
included in the model.  
Besides the residual velocity of money, the current exchange rate has been 
introduced into the general case, in a double role. Firstly, in an open economy, the 
exchange rate is largely exogenous to technological change, and to the functioning 
of the national banking system. Secondly, it potentially can have a significant 
impact on the velocity of money. After that, the scale factor, namely theoutput of 
the national economy (output-side GDP, ‘rgdpo’ in Penn Tables 9.0), has been 
added to the model. As aggregate depreciation is one of the hypothetically chief 
explanatory factors in the model, and it is being calculated on the base of capital 
stock, price level in investment, has been introduced into the model, in order to 
represent the loop between two sides of the economy - real and financial – as it 
comes to the allocation of capital.  
Finally, three structural characteristics of national economies have been 
introduced in the model: density of population, share of government expenditures 
in the capital stock, and the share of investment in the GDP. Density of population 
has been dropped into the model for two reasons. In the first place, the author 
believes that the density of population is a fundamental characteristic of any social 
structure, still largely neglected in economic research. Besides, the factor of 
population is the base for calculating important variables in the model, beginning 
with the chief measure of pace in technological change, namely aggregate 
depreciation per one million people. Therefore, purely arithmetical endogeneities 
are being introduced into the model via kitchen door. Including the density of 
population as a separate variable is an attempt at clarifying, to the extent of 
possible, the relative explanatory power of those specific endogeneities.The share 
of government expenditures in the capital stock has been included in the model 
because of the previously mentioned stylized fact: this share tends to decrease just 
as the velocity of money decreases, in the global economy. The relative impact of 
this structural factor can be interpreted as the possible substitution between fiscal 
stimulation, and the growth of financial markets. As for the share of investment in 
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the GDP, it seems logical to include it into the model, regarding both the measure 
of technological change (aggregate depreciation per million inhabitants), and the 
inclusion of price level in investment.  
All the economic aggregates expressed in currency units are accounted for in 
constant 2011 US$. With all the assumptions made above, the general case has 
been tested as an econometric model based on natural logarithms of the variables 
involved. Using natural logarithms had two essential functions. Firstly, it allowed 
providing for the differences in measurement scales, as well as very largely 
providing for non-stationarity. Secondly, as the natural logarithm is a power, it can 
be interpreted as incremental change in the Euler’s constant. Thus, it is somehow 
halfway between actually observed values and their first differences, and, by the 
same means, it allows introducing a reasonable component of marginal change in 
the model. Tested on natural logarithms, in a total sample of n = 4 263 country-
year observations, with the Ordinary Least Squares Method (software: Wizard for 
Mac OS), the model yielded an accuracy of R2 = 0,515. A text-like presentation of 
coefficients is being introduced below, and a formal table of coefficients is 
presented in the statistical appendix, at the end of this article. All the coefficients 
yielded, at the t Student test, a significance level p < 0,001, thus significance levels 
are not being given separately. 
Coefficients in the empirically tested general model are the following:  
 
ln(Velocity of money) = - 0,069*ln(GDP; scale factor)- 0,202*ln(Aggregate 
depreciation per million pop) - 0,179*ln(Gov share in the capital stock) – 
0,108*ln(Density pop) - 0,21*ln(Investment share in the GDP) - 0,217* ln(Price 
level in Investment)- 0,007*ln(Exchange Rate) + constant ln = 2,444 
 
In that general case, all the explanatory variables decrease the velocity of 
money, and therefore stimulate the supply of credit per unit of real output. Still, the 
velocity of money has a residual constant strong enough to counterbalance the 
impact of factors included in the model. The hypothetically exogenous exchange 
rate has surprisingly little to say in the general case, just as the scale factor 
represented by aggregate GDP. That allows supposing relatively high robustness in 
the model. Aggregate depreciation per million inhabitants, together with the share 
of government expenditures in the capital stock, have similar strength and sign in 
this general case, which seems to confirm author’s educated guessing about mutual 
substitution between fiscal stimulation, and the supply of money. Summing up, for 
the moment, general empirical check confirms the working hypothesis that there is 
a significant, negative correlation between the pace of technological change, and 
the velocity of money. The next step consists in studying variations from the 
general case, and the possible factors of disturbance.  
 
3.4. Variations from the general case and factors of disturbance 
Variations from the general case are alternative models of the same functional 
link between the velocity of money and technological change, enriched with 
additional assumptions. They are four special cases: absence of residual velocity of 
money, stationary economy, closed economy, and finally technological change 
broken down into three factors (instead of one: depreciation), namely depreciation, 
patentable invention and energy intensity.  
Absence of residual velocity in the circulation of money is a hypothetical case, 
which could mean either a completely passive banking system, which do not assure 
any residual supply of credit to the economy, or a banking system completely out 
of control. In practical terms, this is either credit crunch, or the swelling of a 
financial bubble.In the same time, taking the residual velocity of money out of the 
equation allows testing the robustness of the general case, regarding the possible 
influence of exogenous factors non-accounted for. With the same number of n = 4 
263 country-year observations, the so transformed model yields an accuracy of R2 
= 0,784. As in the general case, natural logarithms of all the explanatory variables 
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display a significance in correlation with the velocity of money at the level p < 
0,001. One makes exception, namely the exchange rate. The coefficients are 
textually given below, and the detailed table is to find in the statistical appendix.  
 
ln(Velocity of money) = - 0,024*ln(GDP; scale factor) - 0,087*ln(Aggregate 
depreciation per million pop) - 0,232*ln(Gov share in the capital stock) – 
0,077*ln(Density pop) - 0,659*ln(Investment share in the GDP) - 0,383* ln(Price 
level in Investment) - 0,005*ln(Exchange Rate) [p = 0,001] 
 
This special case indicates that, first of all, even in the absence of any residual 
velocity of money, the repertoire of factors included in the general case explain up 
to 78,4% of variance observable in said velocity. Some factors have been obviously 
left out. In this special case, technological change strictly spoken, measured with 
aggregate depreciation per one million people, loses much of its impact, to the 
benefit of interaction with fiscal policy, and, most of all, that of general investment 
outlays. That, can have a plausible explanation in the theoretical lines of the 
present research: in the presence of serious disturbance in the banking system, 
expectations as for the strictly spoken outcomes of technological change just stop 
mattering, to the benefit of more short-term decisions.   
Stationary economy, with constant GDP, and thus with no scale factor in the 
equation, is a hypothetical case that the author believes to be quite well fitting 
short-term, individual business decisions, when economic growth is de facto 
unobservable.The assumption of stationary economy does not change much to the 
overall accuracy of the model, which yields R2 = 0.494, with the following 
parameters in the equation, all significant at p < 0,001: 
 
ln(Velocity of money) =– 0,239*ln(Aggregate depreciation per million pop) – 
0,163*ln(Gov share in the capital stock) - 0,124*ln(Density pop) - 
0,21*ln(Investment share in the GDP) - 0,225*ln(Price level in Investment) –
0,006*ln(Exchange Rate) + constant ln = 1,985 
 
In a stationary economy, thus in the absence of observable economic growth, 
the accuracy of the general model remains pretty high, just as the general drift in 
the coefficients of regression. One change is substantial: aggregate depreciation per 
1 million people becomes the single most important explanatory variable, as if in a 
stationary case expectations regarding the obsolescence of established technologies 
were becoming much more important for stimulating the supply of credit.  
The special case of closed financial market can be simulated with the exchange 
rate taken out of the equation and assumed constant. The accuracy of the model 
remains very close to the general case, with R2 = 0.512, and all the coefficients of 
regression significant at p < 0,001, yielding the following equation: 
 
ln(Velocity of money) = - 0,068*ln(GDP; scale factor) - 0,198*ln(Aggregate 
depreciation per million pop) - 0,172*ln(Gov share in the capital stock) – 
0,112*ln(Density pop) - 0,21*ln(Investment share in the GDP) - 0,227* ln(Price 
level in Investment) + constant ln = 2,42 
 
As it is easy to observe, holding the exchange rate constant almost didn’t affect 
the parameters of the equation. The relative volatility of currencies, and thus the 
basic volatility in national financial markets, seems to be simply irrelevant 
regarding the general case.  
In the general case, technological change is unidimensional, observed solely 
through aggregate depreciation per one million people. More complex a picture can 
be studied, by including two components: invention of new technologies, and 
changes in energy intensity. Obsolescence of established technologies is largely 
driven by the coming of new ones, which can be estimated with the indicator of 
resident patent applications per one million people. Technological changes are 
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presently connected in quite an intimate way to energy management, saving, and to 
the shift towards renewable energies. Thus, the inclusion of energy intensity, 
through the variable provided by the World Bank under the label ‘Energy use per 
capita in kg of oil equivalent’ is likely to bring some additional information to the 
general case. Thus, the last special case presented here is the general one enriched 
with the indicators of: resident patent applications per million people, and energy 
use per capita. Those additional variables have been added by the author to Penn 
Tables 9.0, yet their inclusion has driven the size of sample down to n = 2 107 
valid country-year observations. Of course, endogeneity is expected between the 
three measures of technological change (i.e. depreciation, patent applications and 
energy use), and still it is interesting to observe their cumulative impact. With half 
the sample size of remaining cases, this one sticks to pretty much the same 
accuracy, with R2 = 0.445, which is comforting regarding robustness in the general 
logic of the present article. All the coefficients presented below are significant at p 
< 0.001, with two exceptions: energy intensity, significant exactly at p = 0,001, and 
the indicator of patent applications, significant at p = 0.542, thus practically 
random in its impact. The equation develops as follows:  
 
ln(Velocity of money) = - 0,08*ln(GDP; scale factor) - 0,219*ln(Aggregate 
depreciation per million pop) - 0,155*ln(Gov share in the capital stock) + 
0,005*(PatApp per million pop)+ 0,076*ln(Energy use per capita) – 
0,086*ln(Density pop) - 0,408*ln(Investment share in the GDP) - 0,266* ln(Price 
level in Investment) + constant ln = 1,739 
 
The breaking down of technological change into more component variables did 
not bring much to the explanatory power of the general model. Whether it is 
because of endogeneities, or for other reasons, remains to be explained. Still, the 
indicators of patentable invention and energy intensity look rather like disturbance 
factors to the general case.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This article develops a line of research, where the way that financial markets 
work is closely correlated with the pace of technological change, and, more 
specifically, with the pace of obsolescence in the established technologies. The 
research has been inspired by the observable concurrence of three big trends in the 
global economy - decreasing velocity of money, increasing burden of aggregate 
depreciation on national income, and decreasing average share of government 
expenditures in the national capital stock – accompanied by the immensely 
interesting wave of experimentation with the so-called cryptocurrencies.  
Empirical research developed in this article generally confirms the initially 
formulated hypothesis that there is a significant, negative correlation between the 
supply of money, and the pace of technological change. This correlation pertains to 
the classical assumption that financial markets are a social mechanism that 
facilitates the allocation of capital. The here-presented empirical research partly 
contradicts the view that financial markets have been developing without 
connection with real life, and have been an autonomous source of economic crises. 
On the contrary, the author feels entitled to claim that cases of financial instability, 
like speculative bubbles, can be seen as instances of imperfect adaptation in an 
otherwise quite rational process, namely that of looking for a good match between 
technological change, and the mechanisms of financing that change. The 
imperfectness of that adaptation can be hinted through the formal analysis in terms 
of geometric Brownian motion, regarding the supply of money and aggregate 
depreciation. The former is systematically more prone to both volatility and 
drifting than the latter.   
The functioning of financial markers implies two sides: demand and supply. 
This article focuses mostly on the former, i.e. it attempts at explaining, how can the 
real sector of the economy generate a growing, and still rational demand for money 
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per unit of real output. The path still to explore is the supply response from the part 
of financial institutions.  
The article does not refer directly to neither of the two classical concerns of 
financial economics, namely interest rates and inflation. The author considers those 
grounds as very profoundly studied, and wanted to avoid redundancy. Instead, the 
purpose of the article is to return to the roots of financial markets, and bring a 
contribution to explaining their link with the real side of the economy. If not the 
interest rates, then what could be the practical interest of the here-presented 
research? The author believes that in the presence of decreasing economic power in 
governments, and decreasing velocity of money, the latter can be purposefully used 
to stimulate technological change, e.g. faster prevention of climate change or 
providing for food security. Still, as interest rates are historically low, there is not 
much room for experimentation in that direction. However, the phenomenon of 
translating the old business pattern of block-chained transactions into a technology 
of block-chains opens new prospects. Cryptocurrencies, instead of being treated as 
pirates in a world of respectable sailors, could be positive examples of the path to 
follow, namely to create, purposefully, networks of local portfolios endowed with 
block-chained units of exchangeable value. As far as the topic of climate change is 
concerned, Meier et al. (2015) have convincingly proven that market-based 
incentives work definitely better that fiscal stimulation, in the transition towards 
renewable energies. Why couldn’t we envisage cities issuing their own, block-
chained, virtual currencies pegged on the value of renewable energy produced in 
those cities? Why couldn’t we conceive migrations between cities smoothed and 
facilitated by the acquisition, or divestment, of those local currencies?  
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Appendices 
 
 
 
Table 1. Coefficients of the general case 
variable coefficient std. error t-statistic p-value 
ln(GDP; scale factor) -0,069 0,006 -11,241 0,000 
ln(Aggregate depreciation per 1 million people) -0,202 0,011 -19,002 0,000 
ln(Density of population (people per sq km)) -0,108 0,005 -22,706 0,000 
ln(Share of investment in GDP) -0,21 0,024 -8,867 0,000 
ln(Price level in investment) -0,217 0,014 -15,604 0,000 
ln(Exchange rate) -0,007 0,001 -5,608 0,000 
ln(Share of government expenditures in the capital stock) -0,179 0,021 -8,712 0,000 
constant 2,444 0,124 19,732 0,000 
 
 
 
Table 2. Coefficients of the special case with no residual velocity of money 
variable coefficient std. error t-statistic p-value 
ln(GDP; scale factor) -0,024 0,005 -4,4 0,000 
ln(Aggregate depreciation per 1 million people) -0,087 0,007 -11,766 0,000 
ln(Density of population (people per sq km)) -0,077 0,005 -15,026 0,000 
ln(Share of investment in GDP) -0,659 0,015 -44,825 0,000 
ln(Price level in investment) -0,383 0,011 -35,906 0,000 
ln(Exchange rate) -0,005 0,001 -3,225 0,001 
ln(Share of government expenditures in the capital stock) -0,232 0,023 -10,206 0,000 
 
 
 
Table 3. Coefficients of the special case with stationary economy 
variable coefficient std. error t-statistic p-value 
ln(Aggregate depreciation per 1 million people) -0,239 0,012 -19,351 0,000 
ln(Density of population (people per sq km)) -0,124 0,005 -24,225 0,000 
ln(Share of investment in GDP) -0,21 0,024 -8,657 0,000 
ln(Price level in investment) -0,225 0,014 -16,165 0,000 
ln(Exchange rate) -0,006 0,001 -4,866 0,000 
ln(Share of government expenditures in the capital stock) -0,163 0,02 -8,231 0,000 
constant 1,985 0,107 18,549 0,000 
 
 
 
Table 4. Coefficients of the special case with constant exchange rate 
variable coefficient std. error t-statistic p-value 
ln(GDP; scale factor) -0,068 0,006 -11,115 0,000 
ln(Aggregate depreciation per 1 million people) -0,198 0,01 -18,971 0,000 
ln(Density of population (people per sq km)) -0,112 0,005 -23,517 0,000 
ln(Share of investment in GDP) -0,21 0,024 -8,909 0,000 
ln(Price level in investment) -0,227 0,013 -17,062 0,000 
ln(Share of government expenditures in the capital stock) -0,172 0,02 -8,522 0,000 
constant 2,42 0,123 19,68 0,000 
 
 
 
Table 5. Coefficients of the special case with complex technological change 
variable coefficient std. error t-statistic p-value 
ln(GDP; scale factor) -0,076 0,008 -9,649 0,000 
ln(Aggregate depreciation per 1 million people) -0,207 0,026 -7,966 0,000 
ln(Resident patent applications per 1 million pop) -0,002 0,008 -0,24 0,810 
ln(Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita)) 0,071 0,023 3,029 0,002 
ln(Density of population (people per sq km)) -0,079 0,006 -12,426 0,000 
ln(Share of investment in GDP) -0,392 0,043 -9,059 0,000 
ln(Price level in investment) -0,257 0,021 -12,06 0,000 
ln(Exchange rate) -0,016 0,002 -6,564 0,000 
ln(Share of government expenditures in the capital stock) -0,143 0,03 -4,706 0,000 
constant 1,714 0,196 8,741 0,000 
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